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AG Mengozzi’s conclusion in  
X and X v. Belgium on the positive 
obligation to issue humanitarian visas 
A legitimate plea to ensure 
 safe journeys for refugees 
Evelien Brouwer 
Introduction – Findings of the Advocate General 
On 7 February 2017, Advocate General (AG) Paolo Mengozzi published his opinion in the case X 
and X v Belgium, C-638/16 PPU, in which he concluded that EU member states have a positive 
obligation to issue a humanitarian visa to Syrian families based on the Visa Code and their 
obligations under Article 4 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights (CFR) to protect individuals 
against inhuman and degrading treatment or torture. Even if there may be doubts whether the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) will follow the reasoning of the AG, his conclusions 
have been welcomed by many who criticise the current EU governments for their lack of an 
effective and humanitarian response to the current refugee crisis.1 
The case, which was submitted by the Belgian immigration court (Raad voor Vreemdelingen-
betwistingen) to the CJEU on 8 December 2016, concerned an application for a humanitarian visa 
for a Syrian family submitted to the Belgian embassy in Beirut (Lebanon). The application had been 
                                                     
1 Violeta Moreno-Lax, “Asylum Visas as an Obligation under EU law: Case C-638/16 PPU, X, X v. État belge (Part I 
and II)” (http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/asylum-visas-as-an-obligation-under-eu-law-case-ppu-c-63816-x-x-v-etat-
belge/) and Maximilian Steinbeis, “Visa für Aleppo”, VerfBlog, 2017/2/07 (http://verfassungsblog.de/visa-fuer-
aleppo/), DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17176/20170208-092501; Margarite Zoeteweij-Turhan and Sarah Progin-
Theurkauf, “AG Mengozzi’s Opinion on Granting Visas to Syrians from Aleppo: Wishful Thinking?” 
(http://europeanlawblog.eu/2017/02/14/ag-mengozzis-opinion-on-granting-visa-to-syrians-from-aleppo-
wishful-thinking/) and Jean-Yves Carlier and Luc Leboeuf The X. and X. case: Humanitarian visas and the genuine 
enjoyment of the substance of the rights, towards a middle way? (http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-x-and-x-case-
humanitarian-visas-and-the-genuine-enjoyment-of-the-substance-of-rights-towards-a-middle-way/). 
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rejected by the Belgian authorities based on the argument that it lacked any humanitarian 
grounds.2 In a parallel case before the same court, the Belgian Secretary of State for Asylum and 
Migration, Theo Francken, had been ordered to issue a short-term visa to a Syrian family in 
comparable circumstances, under a penalty of a fine of €4,000 for every day the immigration 
authorities would fail to issue the visa. When Francken refused to execute this order, preferring 
to pay a large sum of money rather than allow this case to become a precedent, the court’s order 
was later suspended by the Brussels’ Court of Appeals, awaiting the outcome of the preliminary 
procedure at stake, in the case X and X.3 
This latter case, which now awaits the judgment of the CJEU, focuses on the interpretation of 
Article 25 (1) (a) of the Visa Code (Regulation 810/2009) in connection with the member states’ 
obligation under Article 4 CFR. Article 25 (1) (a) of the Visa Code states that “exceptionally” 
member states should issue a visa with territorial limited validity (TLV visa) when “the Member 
State concerned considers it necessary on humanitarian grounds, for reasons of national interest 
or because of international obligations”. In its first question to the CJEU, the Belgian court asked 
whether the words “international obligations” in Article 25, encompass the whole body of rights 
as protected by the CFR, and in particular Articles 4 and 18, and whether they cover the obligations 
of member states under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 33 of the 
Refugee Convention on non-refoulement. Secondly, the Belgian court wanted to know whether 
this means that member states, taking into account their margin of appreciation with regard to 
the circumstances of each case, are obliged to issue a TLV visa on the basis of Article 25 of the Visa 
Code, when there is a risk of violation of Article 4 and/or 18 CFR. As a third question, the Belgian 
court inquired whether the existence of specific ties between the applicant and the member state 
in question, e.g. family relations or sponsorship, would change the answers to these questions.  
With regard to the first question, the AG concludes in the affirmative: yes, Articles 4 and 18 CFR 
apply to the decision-making on the basis of Article 25 of the Visa Code and yes, these EU law 
obligations incorporate international law obligations as based on the ECHR and the Refugee 
Convention. The AG also answers the second and most important question in the affirmative: yes, 
there is an obligation to issue a short-term visa with territorial limited validity on the basis of Article 
25 Visa Code where there are serious grounds to believe that refusal to issue a visa would directly 
result in the applicants being subjected to a treatment prohibited by Article 4 CFR and would 
prevent them from their only legal resource to enjoy his or her right to apply for international 
protection. Dealing with the third and final question, the AG briefly states that member states are 
                                                     
2 In fact, in their application, the (Orthodox Christian) applicants submitted evidence showing that one member of 
the family had been tortured, reported that they were denied the right to register in Lebanon as asylum seekers 
and noted that the borders between Lebanon and Syria had been closed. Furthermore, at that time, the 
recognition rate of asylum applications by Syrians in Belgium was 97.6% and the Belgium authorities were 
following a policy of issuing humanitarian visas to Syrians. Apparently this policy was only stopped in the summer 
of 2016, owing to a lack of staff. 
3 All relevant judgments (partially in Dutch and French) can be found at http://kruispuntmi.be/nieuws/dvz-
veroordeeld-tot-afgifte-humanitair-visum-type-c-aan-syrisch-gezin.  
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under these obligations, irrespective of whether or not there are any ties between the applicant 
and the member state in question. 
Regardless of whether the CJEU will follow the AG or not, these conclusions will remain important 
for future discussions dealing with the responsibilities and legal duties of the EU and the EU 
member states towards the current refugee crisis. His opinion is worth reading and rereading 
again, not only because of the legal reasoning applied for his conclusions, but also for his implied 
indignation about the lack of empathy and will on the part of EU’s governments to take up their 
responsibilities towards the victims of mass violence and persecution outside the borders of the 
EU and of human trafficking. AG Mengozzi explicitly states that his conclusions are based on 
“thorough reflections” taking into account the universal values on which the European Union is 
based, including the protection of the fundamental rights of the most vulnerable persons and their 
right to international protection.  
He underlines that these values should be protected both within the territory of the EU member 
states as well as in their relations with third states.4 According to the AG, the credibility of the EU 
and its member states is based on implementing precisely these EU rules, such as Article 25 (1) (b) 
of the Visa Code law, which have been adopted to ensure these values. Dealing with the 
submissions of the 14 member states, including Belgium, which attended the oral hearings in this 
case on 30 January 2017 and argued that the obligation to issue humanitarian visas would result 
in the obligation to admit everyone “living in a catastrophic situation” and would result in a 
“uncontrollable flood of visa applications” at the embassies, the AG refers again to the specific 
situation of this Syrian family with minor children, falling under the absolute protection of Article 
4.5 Second, he points to the existing framework established by the EU member states to deal with 
“mass influx of migrants”, in the Directive 2001/55 on Temporary Protection, emphasising that 
this has actually been established to deal with exceptional circumstances.6 Third, he puts the fear 
of member states of receiving large numbers of applications at their embassies in perspective, by 
describing the practical problems migrants routinely face in travelling and obtaining access to the 
EU embassies in Beirut.  
This contribution focuses on three main subjects: i) the extraterritorial application of the CFR, ii) 
the responsibility of member states under Article 4, CFR and iii) the question of when or in which 
circumstances does the discretionary power in Article 25 Visa Code become a positive obligation. 
The Visa Code and extraterritorial application of the CFR 
During the hearing, both the Commission and the attending member states submitted that neither 
the Visa Code nor the CFR applies to the present case, arguing that the issuance of humanitarian 
visas is a matter of national sovereignty not covered by the rules on short-term visas as provided 
                                                     
4 See para. 165-168 of his conclusion, where he also refers to Article 3 (1) and (5) of the Treaty on the European 
Union. The translation from French to English in this contribution is made by the author. 
5 Para. 169-173. 
6 Para. 171. 
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in the Visa Code. In his opinion, the AG refutes this, paraphrasing comparable conclusions of the 
ECtHR (European Court on Human Rights) dealing with the ECHR, by stating that the goal of the 
CFR is to protect rights that are not theoretical or illusory, but concrete and effective.7 Generally, 
considering the absolute right of protection against inhuman or degrading treatment or torture, 
the interpretation of Article 4 CFR follows the scope of 3 ECHR, including its interpretation by the 
ECtHR.  
Nevertheless, in assessing the extraterritorial application of the CFR, it is important to emphasise 
the important difference between the functioning of the ECHR and the CFR. To make states 
recognise their extraterritorial responsibilities under the ECHR, case law of the ECtHR was needed 
to clarify when exactly an individual falls under the jurisdiction of this state, in accordance with 
Article 1 ECHR.8 Developing further its conclusions in earlier judgments, the ECtHR in Hirsi Jamaa 
defined two situations of jurisdiction in the meaning of Article 1 ECHR: first, if national authorities 
of that state employ effective control or authority with regard to territory or individuals abroad, 
and second, if it involves activities of the state through their diplomatic or consular agents abroad 
or on-board of crafts and vessels under the flag of that state.9 Here the extra-territorial 
responsibility of states follows from their de jure or de facto jurisdiction under the ECHR, also 
based on the premise that states should not be allowed to take actions outside their territory that 
they are prohibited from taking inside.10 
When dealing with the obligations of member states under the CFR, however, the extraterritorial 
application is implied in Article 51 (1) CFR itself. According to this provision, member states are 
bound by the CFR when they are implementing or executing EU law, irrespective of whether these 
actions take place in or outside EU territory. In other words, the provisions of the Charter address 
the EU institutions and member states when applying EU law, “independent of any criterion of 
territoriality”.11 Instead of the question whether actions of the member states fall within their 
jurisdiction as under the ECHR, in EU law it is the scope of EU law and the principle of effectiveness 
that defines the applicability of the CFR.12  
                                                     
7 Para. 158. 
8 See James C. Hathaway and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, “Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative 
Deterrence”, Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 106 [2014], p. 29 ff 
(http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/106) and Violeta Moreno-Lax, “Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy 
or the Strasbourg Court versus Extraterritorial Migration Control?”, Human Rights Law Review 12: 3, pp. 574-598 
and in her aforementioned blog “Asylum Visas as an Obligation under EU law: Case C-638/16 PPU, X, X v. État belge 
(Part II)” http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/asylum-visas-as-an-obligation-under-eu-law-case-ppu-c-63816-x-x-v-etat-
belge-part-ii/.  
9 Hirsi Jamaa v Italy para. 73-75 with references to the earlier judgments Bancovic and Others v. Belgium and 
Others No. 52207/99, 12 December 2001 and Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom No. 55721/07, 7 July 2011. 
10 Phrased as the ‘double standard test’ by judge Pinto de Albuquerque in his concurring opinion to the Hirsi Jamaa 
judgment, stating ‘A State also lacks good faith when it engages in conduct outside its territory which would be 
unacceptable inside in view of its treaty obligations’. 
11 Para. 89 of the opinion. 
12 See also Violeta Moreno-Lax and Cathryn Costello, “The Extraterritorial Application of the Charter: From 
Territoriality to Facticity, the Effectiveness Model”, in S. Peers et al. (eds), Commentary on the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014, pp. 1657-1683. 
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This implication of Article 51 (1) CFR for the extraterritorial protection of fundamental rights in the 
framework of EU law has been recognised by the CJEU in judgments dealing with the right to 
privacy and data protection. In the Schrems and the Digital Rights Ireland cases, the CJEU already 
affirmed that the protection of the right to privacy and data protection, as included in Articles 7 
and 8 CFR, would be rendered meaningless if the implied obligations of the member states would 
stop at the external borders of the EU.13 In Digital Rights Ireland, the CJEU annulled the data 
retention Directive because of its massive powers of collecting and using personal data of 
individuals and its general lack of sufficient safeguards. Dealing with the right to supervisory 
control as included in the right to data protection, the CJEU found that:”…, it should be added that 
that directive does not require the data in question to be retained within the European Union, 
with the result that it cannot be held that the control, explicitly required by Article 8(3) of the 
Charter, by an independent authority of compliance until the requirements of protection and 
security are fully ensured.  
Such a control, carried out on the basis of EU law, is an essential component of the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.” In this case, it was exactly because of 
the lack of extraterritorial guarantees for a supervisory control mechanism in order to safeguard 
the right to data protection, the CJEU found that the right in Article 8 (3) CFR had been violated. 
Comparably, in Schrems, dealing with the question whether the Data Protection Directive 95/46 
applied with regard to data outside the EU, the CJEU held: “If that were not so, persons whose 
personal data has been or could be transferred to the third country concerned would be denied 
the right, guaranteed by Article 8(1) and (3) of the Charter, to lodge with the national supervisory 
authorities a claim for the purpose of protecting their fundamental rights”.14 
Furthermore, the question of extraterritorial application of the CFR has been dealt with by the 
General Court in the case of Front Polisario v. Council dealing with the EU-Morocco Trade 
Agreement.15 Addressing the obligations of the EU Council when concluding such a bilateral 
agreement with a third state, the General Court pointed to the extraterritorial implications of such 
treaty for the fundamental rights of those persons who are abroad and affected by the 
consequences of this Agreement, namely the inhabitants of the Western Sahara who would fall 
under the scope of this treaty, according to the organisation Frente Polisario.  
The General Court explicitly referred to the extraterritorial application of the rights to human 
dignity, life and personal integrity (Articles 1 to 3), the prohibition of slavery and forced labour 
(Article 5), professional freedom (Article 15), business freedom (Article 16), the right to property 
(Article 17), and the right to fair and equitable working conditions including the prohibition of child 
labour and protection of young people at work (Articles 31 and 32). Deciding on appeal of the 
Council, the Grand Chamber of the CJEU no longer examined the extraterritorial scope of the CFR, 
                                                     
13 CJEU 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Ireland C-293/12 and C-594/12. CJEU 6 October 2015, Schrems v. 
Data Protection Commissioner, C-362/14. 
14 Para. 58. 
15 T-512/12, para. 227-228. 
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finding the claim inadmissible because of lacking locus standi.16 Based on the reasoning that the 
Treaty as agreed between the EU and Morocco did not apply to the territory of the Western Sahara 
following international law principles, the CJEU found that Frente Polisario had no standing in its 
claim with regard to the violation of rights of individuals outside the scope of that treaty. However, 
this conclusion does not contradict the possible effects as addressed by AG Wathelet in this case 
of bilateral treaties signed by the EU to individuals outside the EU, but falling within the scope of 
the agreement.17 
Responsibility of the member states under 4 CFR 
When dealing with the responsibility of member states to prevent violation of Article 4 CFR, the 
AG Mengozzi points to the analogue meaning of the right protected in Article 3 ECHR and 4 CFR, 
based on Article 52 (3) CFR. The AG refers to the famous Hirsi Jamaa v Italy judgment of the ECtHR, 
stressing the absolute protection of 3 ECHR, “even in the most difficult circumstances such as the 
fight against terrorism and organized crime and increasing numbers of migrants and individuals in 
search of international protection, also against the background of economic crisis”, as its 
extraterritorial application.18 Both the Italian push-back actions at sea in the Hirsi Jamaa case and 
the visa rejection at the Belgian embassy in Beirut in the current case concerned the risk of direct 
and indirect refoulement. In Hirsi Jamaa, the ECtHR found that the prohibition of direct 
refoulement was violated because of the expulsion of the applicants to Libya and the prohibition 
of indirect refoulement because of the threat of expulsion to Somalia. In previous judgments, the 
CJEU emphasised the absolute nature of the right in Article 4 CFR, arguing that this not only 
requires a rigorous scrutiny of national authorities, including courts, when assessing claims of risk 
of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, but it also may engage positive obligations of the 
member states.19 
In the current case, the AG applies exactly these principles to conclude there is a positive obligation 
under Article 25 of the Visa Code to issue a territorial limited visa. As the AG points out, there was 
no prospect for the Syrian family to receive international protection in Lebanon, taking into 
account not only the high number of Syrians in Lebanon, but also the fact that Lebanon is not a 
signatory to the Refugee Convention and the Lebanese government had informed the UNHCR it 
would no longer register any new applications from Syrian refugees. This means that many Syrians 
stay in Lebanon under precarious circumstances, without adequate housing and with no access to 
basic facilities such as water, food, and health care. Furthermore, reports from NGOs indicate that 
                                                     
16 CJEU 21 December 2016, C-104/16P, Council v Front Polisario. 
17 See Eyal Benvenisti, The E.U. Must Consider Threats to Fundamental Rights of Non-E.U. Nationals by its Potential 
Trading Partners, in his blog of 13 December 2015nat http://globaltrust.tau.ac.il/the-e-u-must-consider-threats-
to-fundamental-rights-of-non-eu-nationals-by-its-potential-trading-partners/ 
18 See para. 138 of the opinion, where AG Mengozzi refers to ECtHR Hirsi Jamaa v Italy, 23 February 2012, no 
27765/09. 
19 Aranyosi and Caldararu, C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, dealing with the European Arrest Warrant, and N.S. v. 
SSHD C-411/10 and C-493/10 dealing with the Dublin Regulation, referred to by AG Mengozzi in para. 139. 
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Syrians with Christian confession risked discrimination and violation because of their religion, 
making their stay in Lebanon even more difficult.20  
The AG firmly rejects any alternative on the basis of which the positive obligation for member 
states to issue a humanitarian visa could be denied in these circumstances: “Staying in Syria? 
Unthinkable. Turning back to the smugglers without any scruples for putting the asylum seekers’ 
life in danger, trying to reach for the coast of Italy and Greece? Intolerable. Accept to remain in 
Lebanon as irregular refugee without any perspective of international protection, even with the 
risk of refoulement to Syria? Unacceptable.”21  
Discretionary power as a rule, but positive obligation as an exception 
The wordings of Article 25 and the limited territorial validity of the visa at stake make clear that it 
leaves a margin of appreciation to member states to decide when and to whom a visa will be 
issued. However under present circumstances, based on a systemic reading of Article 25 (the 
member state should issue in case of international obligation), combined with the responsibilities 
under 4 CFR and the obligations deriving from the Schengen Borders Code, this discretionary 
power may turn into a positive obligation. As stated above and underlined by the AG, dealing with 
the application for a humanitarian visa by the Syrian family on the basis of the Visa Code, the 
Belgian authorities were bound by the CFR, including Article 4. This implies that if rejecting a visa 
would result in a direct or indirect risk of refoulement, member states have the positive obligation 
to protect individuals against inhuman or degrading treatment, or refoulement.  
Aside from the CFR, this obligation also follows from the rule that visa refusals on the basis of the 
Visa Code must be in accordance with the conditions and principles as included in the Schengen 
Borders Code (Regulation 399/2016). The CJEU confirmed in the Koushkaki judgment that a 
decision to refuse a visa cannot be based on other grounds as provided in the Visa Code, as this 
Regulation provides an exhaustive list of refusal grounds.22 Article 21 Visa Code provides that when 
examining an application for a short-term visa, the authorities must ascertain whether the entry 
conditions set out in Article 6 of the Schengen Borders Code or Regulation 399/2016 are fulfilled. 
These conditions include the protection of the rights of refugees and non-refoulement.  
First, Article 3 of the Schengen Borders Code provides in general that this Regulation must apply 
“without prejudice to the rights of refugees and persons requesting international protection, 
including non refoulement”. Second, Article 6 (5) explicitly states that third-country nationals who 
do not fulfil one or more of the conditions “may be authorised by a member state to enter its 
territory on humanitarian grounds, on grounds of national interest or because of international 
obligations”.23 From the wording “may” in this provision one could submit that this concerns a 
                                                     
20 See para. 154 Opinion AG Mengozzi.  
21 Opinion, para. 157. 
22 CJEU 19 December 2013, C-84/12, Koushkaki, para 65. 
23 See also the advice submitted in this case, Thomas Spijkerboer, Evelien Brouwer and Yussef Al Tamimi, Advice 
in Case C-638/16 PPU on prejudicial questions concerning humanitarian visa, 5 January 
8 | EVELIEN BROUWER 
 
discretionary power. However, dealing with “international obligations” and taking into account 
the aforementioned Article 3 of the Schengen Borders Code, it is clear that there is no 
discretionary power for member states when dealing with the rights of refugees and the absolute 
right of non-refoulement.  
Finally, the conclusion that there is a positive obligation in cases such as the Syrian refugees, 
follows from preamble 29 of the Visa Code, which states that the Visa Code respects fundamental 
rights and observes the principles recognised “in particular” in the ECHR and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. This includes the right to non-refoulement as guaranteed under Article 3 of 
the ECHR and Article 4 of the Charter and the right to asylum guaranteed under Article 18 of the 
Charter.  
During the procedure, Belgium referred to the addition in Article 21 (1) of the Visa Code, according 
to which member states should give particular consideration “to assessing whether the applicant 
presents a risk of illegal immigration or a risk to the security of the member states and whether 
the applicant intends to leave the territory of the member states before the expiry of the visa 
applied for”. It was argued that based on this latter requirement, the authorities were even obliged 
to refuse a visa, considering that the Syrian family applied for a humanitarian visa in order to be 
granted, or at the least to apply for international protection in Belgium.  
As this would automatically imply they would overstay their short-term visa, this should be 
considered as a ground for refusal, as included in Article 32 (1) (b). This of course is based on a 
very illogical reading of the Visa Code, implying that it would include contradictory provisions. As 
we have seen, Article 25 explicitly provides that member states should issue a ‘territorial limited 
visa’ if considering this necessary on the basis of international obligations. Assuming that the 
issuing of a short-term visa with the goal to be granted a long-term refugee status in the member 
state of choice, this in itself would be grounds for refusal on the basis of Article 21 cq. 32, which 
would render the addition in Article 25 meaningless.  
The necessity to differentiate between a discretionary power of member states to issue a 
residence permit either on empathy or humanitarian grounds and the obligation to grant 
protection to those who qualify for international protection on the basis of the EU qualification 
Directive has been stressed by the CJEU in M’Bodj v. België.24 Dealing with the Syrian asylum 
seekers, it is clear that they fall under the definition of ‘international protection’ risking that their 
claim might be rejected at the embassy as a treatment in violation of Article 4 CFR. Again, it is 
because of the obligation of the member states to prevent such violation of Article 4 CFR, that a 
short term and territorial limited visa should be granted in order to allow these persons to apply 
                                                     
2017(http://thomasspijkerboer.eu/crisis-european-refugee-law-academic/advice-to-the-cjeu-on-prejudicial-
questions-concerning-humanitarian-visas/).  
24 M’Bodj v. Belgium, C-542/13, 18 December 2014, point 46 as well as B and D v. BAMF, 9 November 2010, joined 
cases C-57/09, point 118. 
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for asylum in Belgium.25 This clarifies that their situation is different from individuals applying for 
a humanitarian visa but towards whom EU member states are under no duty to protect them 
against direct or indirect violation of 4 CFR. This is also the reason why both the AG and 
commentators have pointed out that if the CJEU is to follow the AG, this will not open ‘floodgates’ 
of migrants. First, as the AG submits in para 172, there are still too many practical barriers for 
refugees in order to reach embassies. Second, as mentioned above, the risk of violating Article 4 
CFR only applies to a limited group of refugees. 
Conclusion 
The current preliminary procedure X and X v Belgium offers an important opportunity to confirm 
the legal responsibilities of EU member states towards individuals who are in clear need of 
international protection and whose life is further endangered as a consequence of the absence of 
legal venues of migration and the ongoing fortification of the EU’s external borders. In 
international law, diplomatic asylum and the issuing of humanitarian visas are considered as 
belonging to the national sovereignty of states, although this prerogative of states has been 
challenged over the years, emphasising the shared and global responsibility of states to protect 
refugees and to ensure the practical enforcement of rights for those whose lives and freedoms 
are at stake. In the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants of September 2016, the 
General Assembly and the heads of states of the United Nations reaffirmed the principles of the 
Refugee Convention and the rights of refugees and agreed upon the necessity to ensure safe 
migration.26 Launching the adoption of a “global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration” 
during the intergovernmental conference to be held in 2018, this declaration will hopefully be 
used as a new impetus to adopt effective and solid mechanisms of international protection at a 
more global level. 
At the EU level, the positive obligation can be derived directly from Article 25 (1) of the Visa Code, 
read and applied in conformity with Articles 4 and 18 of the CFR, and the implied obligations to 
respect the rights of international protection and non-refoulement in the Schengen Borders Code. 
A clear answer of the CJEU to the questions of the Belgian Court with regard to this obligation 
would provide an important tool to remind EU member states of their legal responsibilities under 
EU and international law.27 AG Mengozzi provided not only the legal grounds, but also a convincing 
moral appeal for such clarification. 
                                                     
25 In fact, already in 2014, the administrative court in Nantes found that on the basis of the French constitutional 
right to asylum, there was a positive duty to issue a short term visa to a Syrian family in Beirut in order to enable 
them to apply for asylum in France., TA Nantes (ord.) 16 September 2014, Mme K. et autres, no. 1407765 . 
26 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants 19 September 2016, United Nations A/Res/1/71. 
27 See Ulla Iben Jensen, Humanitarian visas: option or obligation?, Study for the European Parliament (Policy 
Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs), September 2016 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/509986/IPOL_STU(2014)509986_EN.pdf), where 
she describes the different policies in the EU member states and the unclear provisions of the current Visa Code).  
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analysts 
 Participation in several research networks, comprising other highly reputable research 
institutes from throughout Europe, to complement and consolidate CEPS’ research 
expertise and to extend its outreach 
 An extensive membership base of some 132 Corporate Members and 118 Institutional 
Members, which provide expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding 
board for the feasibility of CEPS policy proposals 
Programme Structure 
In-house Research Programmes 
Economic and Finance 
Regulation 
Rights 
Europe in the World 
Energy and Climate Change 
Institutions 
Independent Research Institutes managed by CEPS 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
Energy Climate House (ECH) 
Research Networks organised by CEPS 
European Climate Platform (ECP) 
European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
